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Abstract
Firms use the labels of family relationships, such as parent
companies, sister banks, and brother-sister controlled groups. This
essay considers whether there are additional insights underlying such
labels that could be portable to the corporate context, using the privateequity-led leveraged buyout as the understudy. By emphasizing
“parenthood” as an essential feature of the relationship between
private equity owners (or sponsors) and their portfolio companies, the
analysis borrows from the rationales commonly relied upon in family
law to balance parental duties and subsidiary rights. Exploring and
emphasizing the role of Private Equity (“P-E”) firms as parents
motivates a shift in perspective that considers downstream and side
stream effects of the P-E model of corporate ownership to complement
the predominant focus on the upstream duties of P-E firms to return
capital to their limited partners.
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I.

Introduction

I.
II.

III.

Firms use the labels of family relationships. We refer to a
company that controls another company as its parent.1 Banks with
common parents are referred to as sister banks and enjoy exemptions
from affiliate transaction restrictions.2 Also, groups of two or more
companies that are commonly owned are referred to as brother-sister
controlled groups under the Internal Revenue Code,3 and each of the
1

While the precise criteria vary case-by-case, a parent company typically
establishes its parenthood over another entity by its ownership of voting shares
or control. See, e.g., Parent Company, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/p/parentcompany.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/EXT8-DK77. Whether an objective or subjective
standard is used in characterizing the relationship between corporate group
members, and even in the case of an objective standard, how, by whom, and at
what level to set the threshold has been a contentious legal issue in a variety of
contexts. See, e.g., Verity Winship, Personal Jurisdiction and Corporate
Groups: DaimlerChrysler AG v Bauman, 9 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 431, 438–42
(2013) (discussing the circumstances under which a subsidiary’s contact may
be attributed to the corporate parent in the context of establishing personal
jurisdiction).
2
In this case, parenthood over sister banks is established by the control of
eighty percent or more of the voting shares of each sister bank. Federal
Reserve Act § 23A(d)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 371c(d)(1)(C) (2012).
3
In this case, parenthood over the brother and sister entities within the
controlled group is established when (i) five or fewer persons own at least an
eighty percent interest in each entity, and (ii) the same five or fewer persons
together own a greater than fifty percent interest in each entity. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.414(c)-2 (1988).
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entities within such groups may be contingently liable for each other’s
liabilities.4 This Article considers whether there are additional insights,
beyond the borrowing of terminology, to be gained from the concept of
family in the corporate context.
To make the discussion concrete, the private equity (or “P-E”)
model of corporate ownership is used as the understudy of potential
family law lessons. Private equity firms are active participants in the
market for corporate control.5 In a private-equity-led acquisition of
corporate control, the private equity firm (sponsor) finances the
purchase of a target company (portfolio company) with a combination
of its own funds and bank loans.6 The borrowed portion is often greater
than the amount of the sponsor’s contribution, and owing to this
leverage component, this type of acquisition is also called a leveraged
buyout, or LBO.7
One reason the P-E model is selected for this study is because
of its misfit with traditional corporate norms. One of the primary goals
of corporate law is to address the agency problems present in the
corporate form,8 yet the P-E model of corporate ownership does not fit
so well within this agency rubric.9 While the private equity firm, acting
as a representative of its prospective portfolio company, satisfies one
4

See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
§ 4062(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(a) (2012) (providing that each of the entities
within a brother-sister controlled group is contingently liable for each other’s
ERISA group liabilities).
5
Bain & Company reports that coming into 2013, general partners of global
private equity funds were “[s]itting on more than $900 billion in dry powder
($356 billion of it earmarked for buyouts).” BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE
EQUITY REP. 2014, at 2 (Feb. 2014).
6
Throughout this Article, the term “corporate parent” is used to refer to the
controlling entity of a subsidiary company, and the term “sponsor” is used to
refer to a private equity firm in its role as the controlling entity of a subsidiary
company (also referred to as a “portfolio company” of the private equity firm).
7
For an expert account of how leveraged buyout transactions are structured,
see generally JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE
CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS (Martin
D. Ginsburg & Russell S. Light eds., 2012).
8
See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1–2 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that
corporate law serves in substantial part to respond to agency problems resulting
from the corporate form).
9
For a discussion of the incentives and ability of private equity firms to
mitigate agency costs, see Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as
Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 148–61 (2013).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2403052

320

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. 34

element of agency (namely, that an agent act for the benefit of its
principal), the other key element of control by the principal of the agent
(i.e., by the portfolio company of the private equity firm) is lacking.10
Also, the private equity firm enjoys significant control11 and private
benefits from the operations of its portfolio companies which suggest a
rethinking of the applicability of traditional corporate principles of
corporate separateness and limited liability that are premised on a
separation of ownership from control.
The aim of this Article is to offer a new perspective with which
to evaluate intra-firm relationships by emphasizing “parenthood” as an
essential feature of the relationship between private equity sponsors and
their portfolio companies, and then, borrowing from the rationales
commonly relied upon in family law, to rethink the balance between
parental duties and subsidiary rights.12 Part II presents the analogy of
corporate families to human families, and Part III, relying on such
parallels, extracts the pertinent lessons for corporate law from family
law, in each case focusing on the relationship between sponsors and
their portfolio companies.
II.

Firms: Families (Elements of Corporate Parenthood)

The academic literature reviewing the intersection of family
and corporate relationships to date has largely focused on family-run
firms.13 The existing literature identifies where the presence of family
10

For a formal definition of agency, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one
person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the
agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control,
and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).
11
For a discussion of the levers of such control, see infra note 189 and
accompanying text.
12
For a rich discussion of the two dominant theories of the firm (managerial
and contractual) and the notable persistence of such theories in the corporate
legal doctrine, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the
Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1501–10
(1989).
13
For a sampling of this scholarship, see generally, e.g., Ronald C. Anderson
& David M. Reeb, Board Composition: Balancing Family Influence in S&P
500 Firms, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 209 (2004) (exploring independent directors and
monitors as a countervailing force to the family board representation in firms
with founding family presence); Mike Burkart et al., Family Firms, 58 J. FIN.
2167 (2003) (exploring the benefits of a professional manager over an heir
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relationships in businesses (for example, in the form of family founders
and successors, family-owned and family-managed businesses, or
family presence on boards) breeds unique considerations that require a
separate and distinct treatment of this subset of businesses from other
businesses that do not have such a family influence.14 This Article
broadens this focus by examining the ways in which firms resemble
families, and parent companies as heads of households, by focusing on
the key elements of control, duty, and liability, which characterize the
parent-subsidiary relationship.
A.

Parental Control

Within families, parental authority is largely seen to be a
matter of private concern—parents have the right to rear children as
they deem fit.15 Likewise, corporate parents exercise nearly free rein
over their subsidiaries through their power to vote on or veto corporate
affairs, elect members of the board of directors or other governing
body, and/or otherwise exert a controlling influence over the corporate
decision-making process.16 There are wide divergences in the type and
level of control exercised by private equity firms in their capacity as

succeeding to a family business in limiting expropriation of minority
shareholders); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in
Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633
(2007) (examining the distinguishing features and related performance and
governance metrics of family controlling shareholders in developing
countries); Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1185 (2013) (studying family businesses as a special subset
of businesses which are better understood through non-market values and
therefore requiring fewer contractual protections).
14
See supra note 13.
15
See Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 267, 295 (1995) ( “[O]ur culture and ideology produce great resistance
to state intervention in families.”).
16
See supra note 1.
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corporate parents—some have been celebrated as superheroes17 and
others criticized for being absentees.18
Specifically in the case of the private-equity-led leveraged
buyout, there are three channels through which parental control is
exercised: (1) the sponsor sets the level and parameters of the debt
component of the leveraged buyout which requires that the portfolio
company generate sufficient cash flow on a periodic basis to repay
the loan; (2) the sponsor is an aggressive monitor of portfolio
company performance as both an equity investor and also to protect
its own business reputation and the capital contributions of its limited
partners; and (3) the sponsor employs management compensation
packages and threats of removal to motivate portfolio company
performance.19
B.

Parental Duties

With power comes responsibility. Parents are tasked with the
responsibilities of “conceiving, bearing, feeding, clothing, raising, and
17

Steven M. Davidoff, The Private Equity Wizardry Behind Realogy’s
Comeback, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 9, 2012, 4:19 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/the-private-equity-wizardry-behindrealogys-comeback/, archived at http://perma.cc/H477-P3WH (noting that
Realogy’s narrow escape from bankruptcy is partially attributable to “the
presence of a sophisticated owner with the wherewithal to help”).
18
The private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management (“Cerberus”) faced
the choice between these two extremes when it considered the exit options
from its failed buyout of Chrysler. See Louise Story, For Private Equity, a
Very Public Disaster, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at BU1 (“If he [referring to
Steve Feinberg of Cerberus who made the decision to take over Chrysler] says
he should have shelled out more money to help Chrysler, he could face the ire
of investors who have already suffered heavy losses on his gambit. If he says
he should have simply dumped Chrysler’s auto arm, while clinging to its more
promising finance unit, he could be accused of caring more about his wallet
than he did about Chrysler’s workers and the automaker’s role in the
economy.”).
19
See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 65 (describing certain buyout organizations’
model as one which “is built around highly leveraged financial structures,
pay-for-performance compensation systems, substantial equity ownership
by managers and directors, and contracts with owners and creditors that
limit both cross-subsidization among business units and the waste of free
cash flow”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2403052

2014-2015

CORPORATE PARENTHOOD

323

teaching children.”20 Similarly, corporate parents are tasked with the
responsibility of providing the subsidiary with capabilities and
resources to “increase the probability of success.”21 One of the few
legal restraints on parental control is the legal duty of corporate parents
to exercise reasonable care to prevent their subsidiaries from harming
others or even themselves.22
Specifically in the case of the private-equity-led leveraged
buyout, in addition to the direct provision of capital and operational
oversight,23 the sponsor may be contractually obligated to supply
additional equity (referred to as an equity cure) during times of distress
or be required to provide a guarantee making the sponsor secondarily
liable for the obligations of its portfolio company.24 In both cases, the
private equity cycle and child rearing cycle are responsible for
preparing and shaping the portfolio company and minor children,
respectively, for the next phase of their lives.
C.

Parental Liability

For human parents, the fact of parenthood is not enough to
impose liability for the acts of their children—it must also be shown
that the parent was aware and had the opportunity to control the child
and prevent harm.25 Similarly, it is a longstanding principle in corporate
20

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 17 (2011) (discussing how
in the United States parents are typically left to raise their children on their
own, unlike in other areas of the world where there is more community
involvement).
21
Andrew Campbell, The Role of the Parent Company, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF STRATEGY: A STRATEGY OVERVIEW AND COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY 564, 585 (David O. Faulkner & Andrew Campbell eds., 2006).
22
See infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
23
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7, at 1-7 to 1-8.
24
For a discussion of recent U.S. trends in sponsor commitments, including the
provision of guarantees, see generally William Curbow et al., United States, in
PRIVATE EQUITY IN 32 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 320 (Casey Cogut ed.,
2013).
25
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965) (requiring that “the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such
control” in order to be held liable for a child’s actions); see also Amy L.
Tomaszewski, From Columbine to Kazaa: Parental Liability in a New World,
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 573, 577 (2005) (explaining that “[t]here must be a close,
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law that a corporate parent is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries
based on the mere fact of ownership or control.26 While “limited
liability is the rule, not the exception,”27 the common law “‘tool of
equity’ known as veil-piercing,” and the theories of liability such as
direct participant liability may apply to the parent-subsidiary
relationship in exceptional cases, with specific application varying by
state.28
Federal liability statutes specify the circumstances under which
corporate parents may be liable for their subsidiaries’ actions, and
notable examples include (1) “control person” liability rules, which
hold controlling persons jointly and severally liable for securities
violations,29 (2) ERISA group liability rules, which hold owners of
eighty percent or greater of equity in a subsidiary contingently liable for
that subsidiary’s failure to make required pension plan contributions or
premiums,30 and (3) the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), which subjects
all “owners or operators” of a contaminated facility to environmental

demonstrable connection between the child’s bad act and some action, or lack
of action, on the parent’s part” in order for the parent to be held liable for a
child’s actions).
26
See William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability
Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1929) ( “Limited
liability is now accepted in theory and in practice. It is ingrained in our
economic and legal systems. The social and economic order is arranged
accordingly.”).
27
Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944).
28
See, e.g., Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 484 (3d Cir.
2001) (“[U]nder both state and federal common law, abuse of the corporate
form will allow courts to employ the ‘tool of equity’ known as veil-piercing,
i.e., disregard of the corporate entity to impose liability on the corporation’s
shareholders.”); Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227, 237 (Ill. 2007)
(“Where there is evidence sufficient to prove that a parent company mandated
an overall business and budgetary strategy and carried that strategy out by its
own specific direction or authorization, . . . that parent company could face
liability.”).
29
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012)
(“Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable . . . .”).
30
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 4062(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1362(a) (2012).
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cleanup costs.31 A corporate parent may also be found directly liable for
subsidiaries’ actions if the alleged wrong is attributable to the parent’s
“own personnel and management” and the parent is a direct
participant.32 Private equity firms are generally insulated from liability
in the event the proposed transaction is not consummated, absent a
contractual obligation to compensate the seller if the private equity firm
breaches a specified condition.33
III.

Corporate Law: Family Law (Lessons for Sponsors)

The current balance of parents’ rights vis-à-vis children’s rights
in family law is described as one where “the law has empowered
children—at least to a degree—and has defined not only their rights,
but also what society and their parents owe them.”34 While the
presumption is that parents will act in the best interests of their children
and are equipped with the necessary expertise, knowledge, and
judgment to advance such interests, to the extent such assumptions do
not hold true, a strong argument for limiting their rights as parents can
be made.
The question of whether judicial and statutory interventions to
parental authority and insulations from liability are appropriate in the
corporate context requires an analysis of whether there are
misalignments between corporate parents’ interests and other corporate
group interests or societal interests.35 Concerns arise when corporate
parents engage in actions which are merely redistributive, which do
nothing to increase, or may even reduce, the size of the corporate pie,
but give the parent an unfair advantage or opportunity at the expense of
other stakeholders.
In the context of the private-equity-led LBO, the leverage
component of the transaction gives rise to acute conflict-of-interest
31

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA) § 9607, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012).
32
Douglas & Shanks, supra note 26, at 207–08.
33
See, e.g., LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7, at 5–124 (describing the reverse
termination or breakup fee).
34
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 262.
35
See, e.g., John E. Coons et al., Puzzling Over Children’s Rights, 1991 BYU
L. REV. 307, 317 (1991) (asserting that if children’s and parents’ interests were
truly aligned, “children would not need rights against their parents, because we
could count on either parental altruism or parental self-interest to serve the
child well”).
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concerns.36 If we view debt and equity as the two pieces that make up
the financing pie, when a greater portion of the LBO transaction is
funded with debt, the sponsor is required to contribute less equity,
which lowers their direct exposure in the event the investment fails.37
Further, in a scenario where the investment is successful, the sponsor
will enjoy a greater return on its equity investment the larger the debtto-equity ratio, which is also referred to as the high-powered nature of
leverage.38 Due to such amplifying effects of leverage, the desired
amount of leverage from the perspective of the sponsor will tend to be
socially excessive.39
To tackle the more thorny questions of the extent, scope,
timing, and means of legal interventions in parent-subsidiary
relationships, this Article presents alternative frames of analysis by
borrowing from the rationales relied upon in family law (e.g., child
protection, child autonomy, and third party and prospective parent
interests) to inform the allocation of parental duties and subsidiary
rights. Rather than dictate one definitive allocation, the aim of these
discussions is to introduce alternative perspectives that consider
downstream and side stream effects of the P-E model of corporate
ownership to complement the predominant focus on the upstream
duties of P-E firms to return capital to their limited partners.40

36

See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7, at 5–12 (“A financing structure under which
PE both leverages its upside yield and limits its loss on the downside is the
essence of a leveraged buyout.”).
38
See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency
Theory, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 509, 512 (2008) (explaining that leveraged
buyouts are primarily driven not by prospects of agency cost savings but by the
economics of leverage, and that any expected agency cost savings should be
considered net of the separate agency costs implicated by buyout structures);
Shourun Guo et al., Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?, 66 J. FIN. 479, 514
(2011) (reporting higher returns to capital when a buyout is financed with a
higher proportion of bank loans).
39
Marc Martos-Vila et al., Financial vs. Strategic Buyers 5 (Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 12-098, 2014), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/
Publication%20Files/12-098_dc44025a-785b-45c5-9d31-60e02f091b7d.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/QF4K-F9AP (finding that private equity buyers
tend to take on more debt than strategic buyers when debt is overvalued).
40
See JOSH LERNER ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND THE
FINANCING OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 39–46 (2012).
37
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Subsidiary Protection

First, family law intervenes with parental rights when “parents
[are] unable or unwilling to take care of their children.”41 The obvious
case is when the health or well-being of the child is at risk.42 Also,
additional rights in the form of “judicial rulings, legislation, [and]
changes in existing programs” are available to children who need
special help, protection, and concern.43 Likewise, corporate law
generally imposes few boundaries on corporate parents’ rights, absent a
showing of abuse of the corporate form.44 Specific to the privateequity-led LBO, some factors that could lead to the limited liability veil
being pierced include undercapitalization, failure to observe formalities,
commingling of assets, commonality (or lack of separation) of business
enterprise, or a finding of fraudulent intent to avoid liability.45
Among corporate “children,” those that are the targets of
private-equity-led LBOs tend to be among the most troubled and atrisk.46 The prime targets for P-E investments are firms that are strapped
for cash, struggling financially, and in fragmented industries—the
common characteristic being that the target firm is not operating at its
full potential.47 The sponsor’s goal is to capitalize on this differential by
using its capital-raising and managerial expertise to turn the firm
around and sell the revitalized firm for “a substantial profit.”48 The
window for this turnaround is driven not only by the firm-specific and
general business conditions, but also the sponsor’s own limited life
span.49 All things considered, the LBO model favors actions that
maximize (vs. maintain) marketable (vs. non-marketable) value within
41

GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 18.
Id. at 262 (“The state can override parental decision-making, but only when
the parents are seriously violating their duties toward their children, when the
health or well-being of a child is at risk.”).
43
Minow, supra note 15, at 272.
44
See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
45
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7, at 3–5.
46
See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
47
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7, at 1–9 (describing a prototypical P-E
investment in “Badco,” “which is suffering losses, is over-leveraged, and/or is
experiencing other financial or business reverses”).
48
Id. at 1–12 (explaining that the private equity “goal is to liquefy the
investment at a substantial profit when portfolio company’s value has been
maximized”).
49
See LERNER ET AL., supra note 40, at 34. Most private equity funds have a
limited term of ten years. Id.
42
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a short (vs. long) time frame as of a finite (vs. continuous) point in time.
To the extent the foregoing characteristics of the sponsor’s decisionmaking model seriously harms the health and well-being of the
portfolio company, and fails to fully internalize the extent of losses
suffered, the sponsor could be said to be in breach of its parental duties.
Depending on the extent and type of harm, varying forms of
legal intervention may be warranted. For example, concerns about the
sponsor’s tendency towards excessive leverage50 at the initial financing
stage could be addressed by regulatory or legal constraints on leverage
ratios. Also, in the winding down of a failed firm whose distress can be
traced back to the actions of the sponsor which has since divested its
ownership interests, a reconsideration of the applicable standard of
review for specific fraudulent conveyance claims or an expansion of
predecessor liability rules which would survive a sponsor’s exit from its
investment in a portfolio company may be warranted.51 Expanding the
group liability concept utilized in pension liability rules52 and the
source of strength doctrine in banking regulation53 could be viable
alternatives for further consideration given the portfolio-based
perspectives of P-E investing.54
B.

Subsidiary Autonomy

Second, family law limits parental rights even in the absence of
a showing of actual or potential harm to the child in instances where the
exercise of parental control impairs child liberation or autonomy.55
Such rights stem from the recognition that a child has the best
50

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the prevailing liability standards see supra notes 26–28
and accompanying text. One potential model for the proposed expansions
could be the bulk sales statutes which require that a seller set up an escrow of
funds received from the sale upon which the creditors can make a claim for a
specified period of time. See David D. Ring, Bulk Sales Problems in
California, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 589 (1954).
52
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
53
The Federal Reserve’s “source of strength” doctrine requires that any bank
holding company that controls an insured depository institution serve as a
source of financial strength for its depository institution subsidiary. See e.g., 12
U.S.C. § 1831o-1 (2012).
54
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7, at 1–5 (describing the P-E model as a highrisk investment in a portfolio of companies which relies on the “geometric
returns when [one] portfolio company is successful”).
55
See Minow, supra note 15, at 277.
51
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information regarding his or her needs and wants and should be given
the right to voice such preferences.56 Such autonomy and information
concerns are also present in the corporate context when viewing each
entity first on a standalone basis and second as a component of the
enterprise.
Specific to the private-equity-led LBO, information
asymmetries between the sponsor and the portfolio company abound.57
Although the sponsor will have had the opportunity to conduct its legal
and business diligence of the portfolio company, the extent of the
diligence will be focused on the suitability of the investment from the
perspective of the sponsor.58 Yet, seemingly minor operational details
with which only the portfolio company is concerned could have costly
implications on portfolio company value if they are not addressed until
after the sponsor obtains actual control.59 One way to ensure adequate
participation of the portfolio company in the LBO financing process is
through documentation standards and the use of dynamic covenants
that can be flexibly adjusted as more information comes to light over

56

This is consistent with the United Nations Convention on Rights of the Child
(Article 12), which requires countries to “assure to the child who is capable of
forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all
matters affecting the child,” and to “provide[] the opportunity to be heard in
any . . . proceedings affecting the child.” G.A. Res. 44/25, at 12, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
57
See infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
58
For a description of the diligence process and investment decision for private
equity firms see, e.g., KKR & Co., L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 22,
2013) (“The objective of the due diligence process is to identify attractive
investment opportunities based on the facts and circumstances surrounding an
investment and to prepare a framework that may be used from the date of an
acquisition to drive operational improvement and value creation. When
conducting due diligence, investment teams evaluate a number of important
business, financial, tax, accounting, environmental, social, governance, legal
and regulatory issues in order to determine whether an investment is
suitable.”).
59
One example would be intervals of collateral reporting that are out of line
with the portfolio company’s business practices. An amendment would require
the coordination of the requisite level of consent required under the loan
document (usually a majority standard). The process becomes further
complicated and costly for matters customarily requiring supermajority consent
(such as amendments of definitions which go to the calculation of the
borrowing base in an asset-based loan), or if consenting lenders were to
demand an amendment fee in exchange for their vote.
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the course of the P-E and portfolio company relationship.60 Such shifts
in practice could provide the portfolio company an opportunity to take
the lead in areas in which it has the best information and control.
C.

Third Party Considerations

Third, family law limits parental rights in some instances to
give way to related third parties’ interests.61 As an example,
Washington’s visitation “statute permit[s] ‘any person’ to petition for
visitation rights, and authorize[s] courts to grant these requests if this
was shown to be in the ‘best interest of the child.’”62 Other states
recognize third party rights to visitation so long as they are consistent
with the child’s best interests, and the variations among states represent
different value judgments in the weighing of parents’ versus related
third parties’ rights.63 Likewise, there has been a rich debate in the
corporate sphere about what allocation of rights between shareholders
and other stakeholders most effectively achieves the overarching
mission of corporate entities.64
Third party considerations in the P-E model of corporate
ownership include, at the narrow end, the other equity investors in the
60

High yield indentures, which are highly negotiated agreements (as they
entail greater post-closing amendment costs due to their publicly-traded and
widely-held nature), provide useful guidance. See generally William J.
Whelan, III, Bond Indentures and Bond Characteristics, in LEVERAGED
FINANCIAL MARKETS, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO HIGH-YIELD BONDS,
LOANS, AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 171 (William F. Maxwell & Mark R.
Shenkman eds., 2010). For example, a covenant basket that is structured as a
universal basket that grows with net income and is available for the portfolio
company’s use across different categories of otherwise restricted transactions
(rather than a fixed dollar and a use it or lose it approach on a category-bycategory basis which is customary) has been used in state of the art financing
documentation. Id. Such covenants allow the portfolio company operational
flexibility while avoiding the need to guess the appropriate amounts and
allocations of covenant baskets between different categories of permissions at
the outset of the transaction. Id.
61
See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
62
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 276 (citing WASH. REV. CODE §
§ 26.09.240, 26.10.160(3) (2010)).
63
Id.
64
See generally R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and
Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 88 (1983) (discussing how the concept of stakeholder interests can be
used to understand corporate value).
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portfolio company;65 intermediately, the existing creditors and suppliers
of goods and services to the portfolio company;66 and at the broadest,
extend to all stakeholders, including but not limited to future owners,
new creditors, employees, customers, the local community, the general
public, and the government. How far the boundary of the relevant
stakeholder extends decides the form and extent of limitations on the
sponsor’s rights. For example, furtherance of minority investor interests
can be achieved by altering the voting thresholds, veto rules, and
dispute resolution arrangements, which help level the playing field;67
implied notice and consent rights provide existing obligees of a
portfolio company with an opportunity to evaluate and exit from
exposures to the portfolio company once it is under new management;
and disclosure requirements could be further expanded if one takes the
view that other stakeholders’ participation will create value in ways and
amounts that outweigh the ex ante benefits of permitting insiders to
keep the fact of the proposed transaction under wraps.68
65

See, e.g., Gregory J. Schwartz, Comment, Regulation of Leveraged Buyouts
to Protect the Public Shareholder and Enhance the Corporate Image, 35
CATH. U. L. REV. 489, 492–93 (1986) (examining the fairness of an LBO for
the control group versus the outside shareholder group).
66
See generally Emily L. Sherwin, Creditors’ Rights Against Participants in a
Leveraged Buyout, 72 MINN. L. REV. 449 (1988) (examining creditors’ rights
generally in an LBO).
67
For a comprehensive survey of preventive devices that may be used to
protect minority shareholders, see F. Hodge O’Neal, Arrangements Which
Protect Minority Shareholders Against “Squeeze-Outs”, 45 MINN. L. REV.
537, 544–57 (1961) (“Most prominent among the devices which may be
serviceable in protecting minority shareholders are shareholders’ agreements,
long-term employment contracts, and charter or by-law provisions requiring
high votes for shareholder or director action.”).
68
See LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7, at 5–111 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s 1998 decision, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), which
required a case-by-case, facts-and-circumstances test, which takes into account
the public’s need for disclosure in deciding whether a company has a duty to
disclose merger negotiations to the public). There has been a recent effort in
the United Kingdom to improve the transparency of ownership of companies
by creating a public register of who owns and controls companies in the U.K.
See Queen Elizabeth II, Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech to Both Houses
of Parliament (June 4, 2014), available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/318553/40634_Quee
ns_Speech_2014_PRINT.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/U4NQ-XKBA
(“The legislation will also . . . establish a public register of company beneficial
ownership.”).
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Combatting Short-Termism

The status of the sponsor as later stage (compared to founders
or venture capitalists (“VC”), who are the start-up or early stage
investors) and temporary (compared to long-term) investors motivates
special considerations that may subject the sponsor to a unique set of
rights and obligations.69 These characteristics of the P-E parent as a
later stage and temporary parent70 suggests potential overlaps with the
status occupied by adoptive parents and surrogates in family law. In the
family law context, while many aspects of adoptive relationships still
remain in the shadow of law,71 key legal developments in this area
include the introduction of “investigation[s] into . . . the suitability of
the child for adoption, and the capability and suitability of those
desiring to adopt, to care for, and to rear the child.”72 Adoption rules
require the consents of all parties involved (including the spouse of
adoptive parent, the child, and the biological parent) and disclosure
rules specify the instances and circumstances under which information
relating to the child (such as medical records) “must or can be disclosed
to adoptive parents.”73 The surrogacy statutes, taking Illinois’
Gestational Surrogacy Act as an example, require a consideration of the
physical and mental capacity of the surrogate and provide intended
parents with the right to restrain surrogates’ actions, such as prohibiting
drinking and smoking and specifying the frequency of medical
testing.74
The sponsor as a later-stage investor has considerations distinct
from founders or VCs.75 The sponsor, by definition, is a financial
buyer.76 Unlike strategic buyers who are themselves operating
69

See LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7 at 1-10 to 1-11.
Id. at 1-10 (explaining that P-E investors typically hold their portfolio
companies for periods of between three and seven years).
71
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 308 (reporting that “[a]bout onefifth of the domestic adoptions in 2002 were handled privately”).
72
4 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 279–80 (1936).
73
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 307; see id. at 305–08 (“Consent
was required from any spouse of an adoptive parent; from the child, if over the
age of twelve; and from the biological parents of the child.”).
74
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/5 (2009); see also GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 20, at 300 (describing contours of the Illinois surrogacy statute).
75
See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
76
A strategic buyer is an operating company doing business in the same or a
complementary business to the target seeking “synergistic increase[s] in value”
from the proposed acquisition, whereas a financial buyer is an investor who has
70
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companies competing with or offering a good or service that is
complementary to that of the target, financial buyers tend to possess
general operational77 rather than industry-specific expertise.78 Some
distinctions between P-E and VC investors are that the former tends to
focus on operational efficiency whereas the latter is driven by human
motivation—P-E is often defined by precision and optimized structures
whereas VC is characterized by serendipity and innovation.79 The two
also diverge in their value creation philosophy—P-E derives value from
“top-down optimization” whereas VC embodies a “bottom-up”
approach.80 The takeaway is that there are fundamental differences
between initial and later stage investors, which should inform the
review of the private equity firm’s role as a parent. Much in the same
way the capacity and suitability of prospective adoptive parents are
investigated with greater scrutiny, and express consents and specified
disclosures are required from all parties involved in an adoption,81 a
heightened review of the sponsor as well as its proposed management

the means to raise sufficient capital to acquire the target and is seeking to use
its managerial expertise to improve the business performance and “resell[] . . .
at a substantial profit.” See LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7, at 1-10 to 1-11
(describing the private equity investor’s goals from a leveraged buyout).
77
Some financial buyers do focus on a few sectors. For an empirical study
explaining this trend and showing that industry-specific specializations
produce higher returns, see generally Robert Cressy et al., Playing to Their
Strengths? Evidence that Specialization in the Private Equity Industry Confers
Competitive Advantage, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 647 (2007).
78
Perhaps for this reason, private equity firms place heavy emphasis on the
quality of the management team. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 7, at 1–6 (“A
frequently heard PE/VC maxim is that an attractive portfolio company has 3
key attributes: superior management, superior management, and superior
management.”).
79
Victor W. Hwang, What’s the Difference Between Private Equity and
Venture Capital?, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2012, 5:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/victorhwang/2012/10/01/presidential-debate-primer-whats-the-differencebetween-private-equity-and-venture-capital, archived at http://perma.cc/RBZ9PSNR (“In private equity, you start with the numbers, and then you try to fit
everything into the numbers. In venture capital, you start with people, and then
you try to figure out what numbers you can make.”).
80
Id. (“We can think of the interplay between venture capital and private
equity as the tension between two mindsets, rather than between two types of
capital. These two mindsets reflect fundamentally polar methods of value
generation: bottom-up creation versus top-down optimization.”).
81
See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
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team and a reconsideration of voting rights and procedures may be
warranted.82
Also, private equity firms’ investments in their portfolio
companies have a finite term and private equity firms usually have no
intent to maintain long-term control of their portfolio companies.83 The
sponsor enjoys supreme control over the portfolio company during its
tenure, but has a finite interest that does not extend to the time horizons
beyond its exit. This short-term lens with which the sponsor views the
portfolio company necessarily informs the structuring and
implementation of the LBO transaction.84 Taking a cue from surrogacy
rules, such negative externalities that could arise from the LBO
structure could be addressed by (1) direct measures such as express
substantive and procedural requirements that entail a showing that long82

Notably, expansions in the scope of merger review in antitrust regulation, as
seen in the July 2011 amendments to the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”)
Premerger Notification Rules, the federal notification program that requires
advance filings and imposes a waiting period for acquisitions, were made to
increase the information that must be provided to the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice in advance of a merger. See Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, DOJ Announce Changes to Streamline the
Premerger Notification Form (July 7, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/07/ftc-doj-announcechanges-streamline-premerger-notification-form, archived at http://perma.cc/
PVU9-DGAS. Prospective parents are now required to submit materials
evaluating or analyzing synergies and/or efficiencies, and a broader array of
confidential information, memoranda and studies, surveys, analyses, and
reports prepared by third party advisors. See FED. TRADE COMM’N,
NOTIFICATION AND REPORT FORM FOR CERTAIN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
ITEM 4(D) (2012) (allowing filer to attach “Additional Documents”).
83
See supra note 70 and accompanying text. In his annual letter to
shareholders, Warren Buffet distinguishes Berkshire Hathaway’s investment in
H.J. Heinz Company (“Heinz”) from a typical P-E transaction by emphasizing
the long-term nature of its investment. See Letter from Warren Buffett,
Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the Shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 28, 2014) (“Though the Heinz acquisition has
some similarities to a “private equity” transaction, there is a crucial difference:
Berkshire never intends to sell a share of the company.”).
84
As an example, the sponsor may focus its attention on carveouts around
permitted acquisitions and add-on financings which provide the portfolio
company with the ability to incur additional financing consistent with the
sponsor’s “buy and build” strategy for exit but may give less careful attention
to tailoring the permissions around capital expenditures that could fuel longterm growth.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2403052

2014-2015

CORPORATE PARENTHOOD

335

term viability has been factored into the sponsor’s analysis and
(2) indirect measures such as limited or conditional availability of
favorable accounting or tax treatment which accrue to sponsors only if
they are able to show that they have skin in the long-term game.
IV.

Conclusion

Protecting children, giving them a voice, and considering the
interests of third parties and prospective parents are powerful narratives
which are used to set bounds on parental powers and duties in family
law. To the extent there are convincing parallels in the structural and
behavioral tendencies between human and corporate families, such
narratives could be imported into the discussions of the proper scope of
corporate parental powers, duties, and liabilities that are ongoing in the
wake of the recent financial crisis.85 If it is the natural and selfperpetuating tendency of firms to be extractive institutions, which, as
explained in the Article, tend to be more pronounced in the private
equity model of corporate control, this is an area where law can
intervene and curb such tendencies by redesigning the baseline
approach. This Article offers several possible interventions that rely on
the essential feature of corporate parenthood in private equity and
portfolio company relationships by relating them to the distinctive role
that family holds in our society.86
One caveat to these discussions is the cautionary view in
family law that legal intervention with private rights may at times
actually harm children and threaten parental authority.87 Any reforms or
reconsiderations of corporate parental duties and subsidiary or third
party rights suggested in this Article must also consider potential
unintended consequences and market distortions that may result
therefrom. Imposing additional burdens on (or reducing the benefits
collectible by) sponsors will reduce the attractiveness of leveraged
buyouts and tend to depress private-equity-led LBO activity. However,
to the extent that the changes suggested are designed in a way that
85

For a detailed overview of the discourse and criticisms of the current
corporate culture characterized by opportunism and short-termism, see Lynne
Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 265, 310–16 (2012).
86
See supra Part III.
87
Minow, supra note 15, at 295 (“The cultural resistance to rights for children
. . . reflects a fear that such public rights would disrupt private traditions and
fail to meet children’s needs compared with reliance on private families.”).
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screens out transactions that destroy rather than create net value, limits
on such LBO activity would lead to a socially desirable outcome.88

88

W. Carl Kester & Timothy A. Luehrman, Rehabilitating the Leveraged
Buyout, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1995, at 120 (making the distinction
between LBOs that provided a “useful format for effective governance of
corporations” and those that resulted in eventual bankruptcy of the portfolio
company).
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